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1. Introduction 
As discussed in an orthodox survey (Levine, 2004), financial intermediaries can improve the (i) 
acquisition of information on firms, (ii) intensity with which creditors exert corporate control, (iii) 
provision of risk-reducing arrangements, (iv) pooling of capital, and (v) ease of making 
transactions. This argument favors a well-developed bank-based financial system. Mishkin (2007) 
also suggests that a better functioning bank credit system can alleviate the external financing 
constraints that impede credit expansion and the expansion of firms and industries.  
In addition, several central banks especially consider the role of credit in the conduct of their 
monetary policy. For instance, in the European Central Bank (ECB)’s monetary policy strategy  
“given the particular importance of bank loans for the financing of euro area firms, developments 
in such loans may have important implications for euro area-wide economic activity” (ECB, 2004, 
p.20). The Federal Reserve also assigns an important role to credit as “policymakers continue to 
use monetary and credit data as a source of information about the state of the economy” 
(Bernanke, 2006, p.2). Moreover, Fernandez-Villaverde et al., 2013 argue that utilizing domestic 
credit instead of external financing allows a country to ease the pressure coming from the 
exchange rate risk on domestic firms.  
On the other hand, as discussed in several studies (e.g. Mendoza and Terrones, 2008; Obstfeld and 
Rogoff, 2010), a rapid growth of domestic credit supply could play a significant role in predicting 
subsequent financial or economic crises, while a deep decline in domestic credit can result in a 
recession in economic activity and financial instability. According to Mishkin (2010), the recent 
global recession of 2007 also reflected one type of asset price bubble, which can be considered as a 
“credit-driven bubble”.  
Due to the crucial role of credit in economic activity of a country, there is a growing empirical 
literature examining the determinants of domestic credit, which may be demand-side or supply-
side factors. Some studies consider both kinds of factors in the same model, while others try to 
distinguish them into two separate models. The determinants of credit supply have been also 
studied in the case of advanced, emergent as well as developing countries. Employing a 
cointegrating VAR for 16 industrialized countries, Hoffman (2001) finds evidence of a significant 
positive relation between domestic credit, real GDP and inflation, but a negative correlation 
between credit and real interest rates. Similarly, Calza et al. (2001), using VECM for a sample of 
European countries, show that in the long-run domestic credit is related positively to real GDP 
growth but negatively to short term and long term real interest rates. Focusing in a large panel of 
non-transition developing and industrialized countries Cotarelli et al. (2005) conclude that banking 
lending is positively related to GDP per capita, financial liberalization and transparency in 
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accounting standards but negatively depends on the public debt ratio. Differing from the above 
cited works, Aisen and Franken (2010) estimate the main determinants of bank credit growth 
during the 2008 financial crisis for a sample of over 80 countries. They find that larger bank credit 
booms prior to the crisis and lower GDP growth of trading partners are the most important 
determinants of the post-crisis bank credit slowdown. On the other hand, structural variables such 
as financial depth and integration level are also relevant. Guo and Stepanyan (2011) examine the 
changes in bank credit across a wide sample of 38 emerging economies during the last decade. 
Their main finding is that domestic and foreign funding contributes positively and symmetrically 
to credit growth. In another recent study of 24 emerging countries, Gozgor (2013) argues that the 
essential determinants of domestic credit are loose monetary policy in the domestic market, 
differences between domestic and global lending rates, and trade openness. On the other hand, 
external balance and perceptions of global tail risk negatively affect domestic credit levels. 
Even though assessing the determinants of bank credit has been an interesting and growing 
subject in the empirical literature, the determinants of credit growth appear to be complex 
(Elekdag and Han, 2012). For this reason, we try to revisit and reexamine the possible 
determinants of domestic credit, which have been questioned in the literature. Domestic credit 
studied in this paper refers to the credit provided by the banking sector to non-financial private 
sector. Our study seeks to contribute to the related literature in several ways. First, following the 
existing literature, we will introduce all potential demand-side and supply-side factors in the 
estimated equation. In addition, we try to empirically model domestic credit level through two 
theoretical approaches, notably bank balance sheet and bank capital requirements. Second, the 
global financial crisis of 2007–2009 experienced the need for banking systems to be more liquid, 
more transparent, less leveraged and less prone to take on excessive risk. Since the recent financial 
crisis, banking system has been demanded to build larger buffers of high-quality capital and to 
reduce the riskiness of their portfolios. In this context, we aim to resolve the question of how 
banking system has adjusted its credit supply to higher capital requirements. Third, we extend our 
empirical analysis for a wide sample covering 146 countries at different levels of economic and 
financial development during the period of 1990-2013.  
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 tries to formulize an empirical 
equation of domestic credit supply basing on the different theoretical approaches. Section 3 gives a 
descriptive analysis of the variables and the instruments used in the estimation. Section 4 
summarizes the data and empirical methodology. Section 5 explains and discusses the empirical 
results. The concluding remarks and policy implications are in Section 6.  
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2. Empirical equation  
The starting point is a primitive type of bank balance sheet in which the bank has no physical 
capital on its assets and no equity on its liabilities. This simple balance sheet is described as 
follows:  
Assets Liabilities 
C: Credits 
R: Reserves 
D: Deposits 
 
The balance sheet can be represented as follows:  
 +  =  (1) 
From the above balance sheet and in developing a framework for the analysis of the banking firm, 
Baltensperger (1980) sets the objective function of the bank as a profit function:  
 = 	 	 −  −  −  −     (2) 
Where rC is the interest rate of bank credit, rD is the interest paid on deposits, l is cost of illiquidity, 
s is cost due to default, and c is the real resource cost.  
From Function (2), we can also generalize the function of credit supply as follows:   
 = ; ;	; ; ; ;    (3) 
Now, we consider another type of bank balance sheet in which the bank has credits, reserves and 
treasury bills on its assets, and deposits and capital requirements on its liabilities. This balance 
sheet is written as follows:  
Assets Liabilities 
C: Credits 
R: Reserves 
T: Treasury Bills (free-risk assets) 
D: Deposits 
K: Capital requirements 
 
In this case, the equation of balance sheet of a bank is presented as follows:  
 +  +  =  +    =  +  −  −  (4) 
Basing on this bank balance sheet approach, the determinants of bank credits supply are bank 
reserves, treasury bills, bank deposits and capital requirement. In general, credit supply positively 
depends on the credit rate of return. This positive relation is, nevertheless, influenced not only by 
other costs stemming from the bank’s decision of credit supply but also by other components of 
balance sheet such as capital requirements and so on. We now study the most important 
determinants to show how they are handled in the model of credit supply.  
Analysis of rates of return 
A bank may allocate its resources either in credits or in government securities. The rates of return 
of a bank  include:  
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- Return in credits supply: 	 −  
- Return in T-bill investment:  −  under the condition 	 >  >  
Considering that  is the bank resource allocation in credits and  is the bank resource allocation 
in T-bills with 0 <  +  < 1, the function of bank rates of return is given as follows:  
 = 	 −  +  −  =  	 +  −  +    (5) 
The credit supply C is expected to be positively related to its rate of return 	 − , and 
negatively to ′, which is the cost of controlling default risk. We assume that these relations are 
linear and given as follows:  
 = ∑ !	 − !"!# + ∑ ′!"!# + $  (6) 
where $ is the vector containing other factors determining bank credit supply.  
 
Analysis of capital requirements 
The capital requirement ratio (CR) expresses the own funds K of a bank as a proportion of risk 
weighted assets and off-balance sheet items.  
 = %&'( %)* +,*-. /0!.1 )2!34&2- '..2&.5"%&!%*'( 6!.1 )2!34&2- 7..2&. ≥ 9            (7) 
where the risk weighted assets are the credit risk assets, and the notional risk weighted assets are 
the operational risk and market risk (RN). The capital requirement ratio can be rewritten as follows: 
 = /):	5);50< ≥ 9 (8) 
Where w1 is the weight for risky credits and and w2 = 0 is the weight for government securities. It 
is assumed that:  
= 0 ≤ ? ≤ ?@'A =  B C CDEFDG DGBF HDIJD BKL DGBF 
According to Formula (8), there is a minimum value b required for a bank Basel index, which is the 
ratio between capital and risk weighted assets. Moreover, the coefficient w1 defined in regulation 
and known by the bank. Following Furfine (2001), we assume that the own capital of a bank 
approximates the minimum level stated by the requirement faces increasing costs. That means:  
 = 9 ↔  = /N): −
0<
): (9) 
Equation (8) means that credit supply positively relates to the own capital of a bank. On the other 
hand, it confirms a negative relationship between bank credits, operational and market risks and 
the Basel index. From Equations 2-6-9, we obtain the following reduced empirical form of bank 
credit supply:  
 = ∑ !	 − !"!# + ∑ ′!"!# + /N): −
0<
): −  +  +  + $ (9) 
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3. Data and variables description 
This paper empirically examines the determinants of domestic credit levels across a wide range of 
countries at different levels of economic and financial development as long as data are available 
(for the list of countries see Appendix A). We exclude the transition economies and small economies 
with a population of less than 500 000 in 2000 from our analysis. The information on the transition 
economies and population size are from the World Bank Global Development Network Database 
(GDN) and the WDI, respectively. In addition, in order to avoid the potential problem of 
heterogeneity in cross-country economic development level, there are five data samples on which 
the estimation is based: (i) the whole sample; (ii) high-income sample (HI); (iii) low-income sample 
(LI); (iv) lower middle-income sample (LMI); and (v) upper middle-income sample (UMI). Our 
analysis employs annual data series from 1990 to 2013, which are collected from many 
international data sources: International Financial Statistics (IFS); Global Financial Development 
(GFD); Global Financial Development (GFD); and World Development Indicators (WDI). Due to 
data unavailability particularly in the case of developing countries, we miss data for some 
countries either at the start of the sample or at the end of sample. For this reason, our panel is not 
balanced.   
With respect to the research objective, the dependent variable is the ratio of domestic credit 
provided by banking sector to private sector to GDP. The choice of explanatory variables is based 
on either the above reduced form of credit supply or the concerned literature. We explain and 
discuss the choice of independent variables as follows.  
 
Internal demand factors 
Following Equation 10, we first introduce the following independent variables in our estimation:  
- Deposit: This variable is weighted by the share of total domestic deposit to GDP. This 
variable allows us to control for the important role of domestic deposits as a funding 
source.  
- Real interest rate: This variable is measured by the lending interest rate adjusted for inflation 
as measured by the GDP deflator. 
- Banking management / operation costs: This variable is weighted by total costs as a share of 
total income. 
- Capital requirement: The ratio of capital requirement is initially provided by Barth et al. 
(2001). However, this data is only available for 2000, 2003, 2007 and 2013. For this reason, 
our analysis will use two alternative indicators. The first one is the share of bank regulatory 
capital to risk-weighted assets. The second one is the share of bank capital to bank assets 
7 
 
instead of the ratio of capital requirement. In fact, the evolution of this indicator can 
partially reflect the change in capital requirement ratio.  
- Systemic banking crisis: We control for the impacts of systemic banking crisis on credit 
supply by introducing a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 during the period of 
banking crisis and the value of 0 in other periods.  
Second, we introduce other variables used in the literature to capture the impacts of internal 
demand factors on credit supply as follows: 
- Real GDP per capital in U.S. dollars: This variable is a benchmark measure of the economy 
health and reflects the demand for credit (Frankel and Romer, 1999). We expect that higher 
domestic income corresponds to stronger domestic demand and higher domestic credit 
(Takats, 2010).  
- Inflation rate: We introduce the inflation rate based on consumer price indices (2005 = 100) 
in the estimation as a control variable to verify the hypothesis of whether there is a 
connection between bank credit growth and price stability.   
- Domestic money supply: This variable is defined as broad money M3 as a percentage of GDP, 
which is considered as a proxy for the overall monetary policy stance. As discussed in a 
seminal work, by using IS-LM framework Bernanke and Blinder (1988) analytically show 
that monetary policy could have a direct impact on bank lending: lower money supply 
leads to less domestic credit growth.  
 
External supply factors 
Together with internal demand factors, we also introduce in our estimation a broad set of external 
supply factors.   
- Nominal exchange rate: As discussed in Borio et al. (2011), a fall in the value of nominal 
exchange rate of a country expresses an appreciation of the domestic currency and thus 
results in an increase in domestic credit.  
- Foreign capital flows: This variable is measured by the share of net foreign direct investment 
and portfolio investment to GDP. Increasing private capital flows is expected to increase 
the volume of domestic credit (Lane and McQuade, 2013). 
- Financial integration level: To capture the level of financial integration, we use the Chinn and 
Ito (2006) index of capital account openness (KAOPEN). The tested hypothesis is that 
higher financial integration level leads to higher inward capital flows, which in turn 
facilitate a country’s financing.   
- Trade openness level: this indicator is measured by exports plus imports over GDP. In fact, 
higher trade openness can relate to higher bank lending but also makes a country more 
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vulnerable to international shocks such as a dramatic collapse in global trade during the 
period 2008-2009.  
 
          Global factors 
This study also aims at investigating the possible impacts of some global factors on bank credit 
supply by introducing in the estimation several explanatory variables as follows: 
- The change in U.S. money supply: This variable is measured by the variations of the share of 
broad money to GDP and considered as a benchmark indicator of global liquidity variation.   
- The change in U.S. Federal funds rate: This variable is used as another proxy for global 
liquidity variation. According to Csonto and Ivaschenko (2013), as lower Fed funds rate is 
assumed to be associated with higher liquidity, it is expected to have a positive impact on 
lending rate and thus to increase lending rates.  
- The difference between the domestic lending rate and the US (global) lending rate: The question of 
interest is whether the domestic banks can borrow from abroad at lower global interest and 
lend at higher domestic interest rates.  
- External debt: this variable is measured by the share of total external debt stocks to gross 
national income. An expected negative relationship between external debt and bank 
lending indicates that a country, with higher international liabilities, is more vulnerable to 
international shocks, which in turn limit access to new funding (Aisen and Franken, 2010).  
- Systemic banking crisis: to control for the impact of any systemic banking crisis on domestic 
credit levels, we use a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 during the financial crisis 
period and of 0 in others periods.  
 
        Characteristics of the domestic banking system 
Following Aisen and Fraken (2010), we assume that bank credit supply is also influenced by the 
characteristics of domestic banking system, which are captured by a set of following indicators:  
- Bank return on equity (ROE) and bank return on assets (ROA): These two indicators reflect the 
benefit of a bank. According to Aisen and Fraken (2010), a bank with sound profitability 
will most likely have great access to financing, but it could also indicate that banks have 
taken riskier positions.  
- Bank concentration: This indicator is constructed by Beck et al. (2000) and defined as total 
assets of the three largest banks as a percentage of total assets of the banking system.  
- Initial development level of banking system: to capture the impacts of initial level of banking 
system development, we simply use the ratio between the banking credit to private sector 
and GDP in 1989.  
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- Bank non-performing loans to total gross loans: This variable is to measure the soundness of 
banking system, which can strongly influence the growth of domestic credit.    
The data sources of all key variables as well as their definition and units of measurement are 
summarized in Appendix B.  
 
4. Empirical methodology 
The present paper aims to explain the dynamics of bank credit supply across countries through an 
analysis of its potential determinants. Given this aim, we endeavor to make maximum use of both 
time and cross-country dimensions of available annual data sets. According to Baltagi (2005), using 
annual data for estimation purposes necessitates making an allowance for the possibility that the 
annual observations on independent variable may not represent long-run equilibrium values in 
any given year because of slow adjustment in explanatory variables. To allow for the possibility of 
partial adjustment, we determine a dynamic log-linear equation for domestic credit which includes 
its lagged dependent variable. Our empirical model is given as follows:  
 
O!& = PQ + PO!&R + PST!&R + PUOV!&R + PWXY!&R + PZY[!&R + \& + $!& 	  (11) 
 
where CREit is the share of bank credit to private sectors in GDP of country i in year t, INTit 
represents different internal demand factors, EXTit represents a broad set of external supply 
factors, GLOit indicates different global financial market conditions, DOMit represents the 
characteristics of domestic banking system, $!& is a disturbance term assumed to satify the Gauss-
Markov conditions, and \& is a trend term accounting for a shift of the intercept over time. 
However, several econometric problems may arise from Equation 11.  
- The independent variables are assumed to be endogenous. This is because causality may 
run in both directions – from independent variables to dependent variable and also these 
regressors may be correlated with the error term. 
- Time-invariant individual characteristics (fixed effects) can be correlated with the 
explanatory variables.  
- Introducing the lagged dependent variable gives rise to the autocorrelation between the 
regressors and the error term since lagged independent variable depends on the country 
specific effect. Due to this correlation, the estimation of Equation 11 suffers from the Nickell 
(1981) bias.  
In this case, a transformation like first-differencing is again required to eliminate the individual 
effects from the transformed equations in order to obtain valid moment conditions. However, 
differencing introduces a simultaneous problem because lagged endogenous variables will be 
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correlated with the new differenced error term. In addition, heteroscedasticity is expected to be 
present because, in the panel data, heterogeneous errors might exist with different panel members. 
To resolve these problems, the GMM method developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) seems to 
produce more efficient and consistent estimators compared with other procedures. The GMM 
method also eliminates any endogeneity that may be due to the correlation of the country specific 
effects and the right hand side regressors. This technique treats all the variables other than the 
lagged dependent variable by assuming that they are uncorrelated with the error term ε^_. 
According to Baltagi (2005), in this case, we should lag all the right hand side regressors by one 
period, which makes this assumption more innocuous and is sufficient to prevent any bias in the 
estimated coefficients due to simultaneous common shocks to credit supply and the explanatory 
variables. If we first difference Equation 11, we get:  
 
∆O!& = P∆O!&R + P∆ST!&R + PU∆OV!&R + PW∆XY!&R + PZ∆Y[!&R + ∆$!& 	 (12) 
 
Equation 12 has removed the group effects and time trend. Arellano and Bond (1991) also develop 
the serial correlation test, in which the null hypothesis assumes no serial correlation in error term. 
The authors introduce the serial correlation test, often labelled “m1” for first-order and “m2” for 
second-order serial correlation. We expect to find first-order serial correlation in the first 
differenced residuals. The key problem arises if there is second or higher order serial correlation, 
as this would suggest that some of the moment conditions are invalid.  
Before estimating the regression of interest, we report the means and standard-errors of dependent 
and independent key variables in Table 1. In addition, Table 1 provides the correlation coefficients 
between bank credit and all covariates. It can be seen that bank credit variable displays 
considerable variation both between and within countries, justifying the use of panel estimation 
techniques. As shown in Table 1, most of correlation coefficient are significant. This result aids the 
modelling and helps to confirm the choice of dependent variables. However, the values of 
correlation coefficient are diverse, ranging from negative to positive, from small to important. For 
instance, we find a negative and significant value of correlation coefficient between bank credit 
and bank operation costs, while that between bank credit and bank deposit is significantly 
positive. Looking at the external supply factors, bank credit is much less correlated to capital 
inflows than trade openness. The results on correlation coefficients show that the magnitudes, the 
statistical significance even the sign of correlation coefficient have been more or less altered. Thus, 
we should not be surprised to see different empirical results for different data samples.  
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5. Empirical analysis 
This section reports the results of GMM estimator and robustness tests. It also outlines the results’ 
implications for the considered theoretical hypotheses. On the other hand, the continuous and 
consistent financial data, in particular the data on capital requirement and characteristics of 
domestic banking system, are lacking. Therefore, to make maximum use of both time and cross-
country dimensions of available annual data sets, we estimate four following alternative models:  
- Model 1 includes all potential explanatory variables.  
- Model 2 excludes bank operation costs and capital requirement. 
- Model 3 excludes the characteristics of domestic banking system. 
- Model 4 excludes bank operation costs, capital requirement, and also the characteristics of 
domestic banking system. 
<Insert Table 2> 
Table 2 reports the GMM results in two parts. The upper show the estimated coefficients and their 
robust standard errors for each model of interest. The lower presents the serial correlation test. 
According to the results, the first order serial correlations (m1) are expected because of first 
differencing, and the p-values obtained suggest no significant second order serial correlation (m2). 
Thus, we should reject the null hypothesis of the absence of first order serial correlation and not 
reject the absence of second order serial correlation. This result implies that our estimated models 
satisfy the required orthogonal conditions.2   
 
Role of internal demand factors. Going straight to the hypothesis of interest, we note that the 
estimated coefficients of bank deposit enter in all models with a negative but statistically 
insignificant value. This means that there is no direct link between deposits and loans. In other 
words, if private sectors do not wish to borrow, no amount of money supply will encourage them 
to do so. This result does not support the classical loanable funds theory, according to which bank 
loans depend on pre-existent savings. By contrast, bank credit seems to positively depend on 
lending interest rate, when all estimated coefficients of this variable are positive and statistically 
significant. This is a quite important phenomenon implying that high lending rate may not 
necessarily translate into poor lending performance or lower proportion of commercial banks’ 
funds available for lending respectively. Another potential determinant of bank credit is the share 
of operation costs in total income. In all regressions, the coefficients have the expected negative 
signs but statistically insignificant. Regarding the capital requirements, they all come out with the 
                                                          
2
 Together with the serial correlation test, another key test of the GMM estimator is the Sargan test to assess the model 
specification and over-identifying restrictions, whether the instruments, as a group, appear exogenous. This test is also 
known in the GMM context as Hansen’s J test. However in this paper, the Sargan test’s results are not reported since it is 
not possible to estimate the Sargan statistic with robust to heteroskedasticity standard errors. 
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expected negative signs and statistically significant. For instance, an increase in regulatory capital 
can reduce the supply of loans, meaning that there is a trade-off between solvency and loan 
supply. On the other hand, higher level of capital corresponds to more important credit supply.  
We now turn our attention to other explanatory variables concerning economic activity. First, we 
find that economic growth captured by GDP per capita does not play any significant role in 
explaining bank lending. This result is not consistent with the hypothesis of a pro-cyclical 
relationship between economic growth and bank lending. For instance, Dell’Ariccia and Marquez 
(2006) suggest that bank credit expansions tend to be pro-cyclical, meaning that high economic 
growth tends to induce a high level bank credit supply. Precisely, during the period of economic 
boom, banks relax their criteria of selection and lend to both efficient and less efficient projects, 
while during the period of economic recession, bank credit dries up due to a high level of 
nonperforming loans and default risk. Second, we reveal an expected negative but insignificant 
relationship between inflation and bank lending. The negative impact of inflation on bank credit 
has been widely explained by the existing literature. For example, according to Huybens and 
Smith (1998, 1999), high inflation is detrimental to the development of the financial system when it 
limits the amount of external financing available to borrowers. Furthermore, Boyd et al. (2001) 
suggest that in high inflation environments, financial intermediaries are less willing to engage in 
long-run financial projects. Rousseau and Wachtel (2002, p.780) also argue that “high inflation will 
discourage any long term financial contracting and financial intermediaries will tend to maintain 
very liquid portfolios. In this inflationary environment intermediaries will be less eager to provide 
long-term financing for capital formation and growth.” Third, we consider the liquidity effects on 
bank credit growth by using the monetary supply. In contrary to the insignificant effect of 
economic growth and inflation, the coefficients of monetary supply are highly statistically 
significant and have the expected positive sign. This means that monetary policy could have a 
direct impact on bank lending, which is so-called “ bank credit channel” of monetary policy: an 
increase in liquidity allow banks to expand their supply of loans and thus making credit more 
available to bank-dependent borrowers (e.g. Bernanke and Blinder, 1992; Kashyap and Stein, 2000). 
 
Role of external supply factors. First, we consider the exchange rate as one of relevant external 
supply factors influencing bank lending. As reported in Table 2, the estimated coefficients 
associated to the exchange rate variable are negative and strongly significant. This result supports 
the negative impact of exchange rate on credit supply, which can be explained in two ways. On the 
one hand, an increased value of domestic currency of a country can reduce its exports, which in 
turn negatively influences domestic bank credit. On the other hand, the devaluation of domestic 
currency of a country may also reflect a risky economic environment that worsens bank credit 
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supply. Second, we find that economic integration differently influences bank lending. The 
estimated coefficients of FDI flows enter in all models with the expected positive sign but 
statistically insignificant value. Accordingly, domestic bank credit does not depends on inward 
FDI. In other words, we can consider foreign investment as a funding source of domestic economic 
activities rather than a source of bank lending. Similarly, we do not find evidence that higher trade 
openness can contribute to bank credit. By contrast, when we control for the characteristics of 
domestic banking systems (Model 1-2), the KAOPEN index has negative and significant 
coefficients. This is because higher financial integration facilitates a country’s financing, but it also 
makes it more vulnerable to international shocks. High vulnerability of banking systems can, in 
turn, reduce their credit supply.  
 
Role of domestic banking system’s characteristics. As mentioned above, the present paper also 
tends to revisit the impact of the characteristics of domestic banking system on bank credit growth. 
First, we find no evidence of an interaction between ROE/ROA and bank credit supply. This result 
does not support the hypothesis that banks with sound profitability have great access to financing. 
Second, the bank concentration variables have negative and significant estimated coefficients in all 
regressions, meaning that countries with a more concentrated banking industry displayed smaller 
growth rates of bank credit.3 Lastly, as expected we reveal that an increase in non-performing 
loans can reduce credit supply of domestic banking system.  
 
Role of global factors. We now turn our attention to the role of global factors in explaining bank 
credit growth. As showed in Table 2, they enter in all models with the expected signs but are 
mostly not statistically significant. The domestic and global lending rate difference is the sole 
exception. The coefficients of this variable are negative and statistically significant. This finding 
does not accord with Magud et al. (2012), who argue that the increasing interest rate spread 
between domestic and global markets would allow domestic banks to borrow at the lower global 
interest rate and to lend at the higher domestic interest rate. In other words, our empirical result 
reveals that the lower global interest rate cannot contribute to bank credit growth. In fact, the low 
global (U.S.) interest rate environment of recent years has been challenging for banks that rely on a 
wide spread between long- and short-maturity yields to generate earnings, and associated with 
decreased profitability for banks, particularly for small institutions not only in the U.S. but also in 
other banking systems. Therefore, even though the global interest rate is lower, bank credit supply 
dries up due to a decrease in bank profitability.  
                                                          
3 Bank concentration in Beck et al. (2000) is defined as total assets of the three largest banks as a percentage of total assets 
of the banking system. 
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Robustness checks  
On the whole, the impacts of potential determinants on explaining bank credit supply are diverse. 
They vary across countries at different levels of economic development, and also depend on the 
size of data sample. For this reason, the first robustness check is to re-examine all hypotheses of 
interest for different country groups in order to avoid the possible biased results due to the 
heterogeneity of economic development levels.  
As stated above, basing on four different levels of economic development, we simply split the full 
data sample into four sub-samples: low-income (LI), lower middle-income (LMI), upper middle-
income (UMI), and high-income (HI) countries. For each country sample, we also reuse the GMM 
technique with robust standard errors to re-estimate al models of interest. The empirical results are 
reported in Tables 3-6. Here, we only discuss the results complementing to and differencing from 
those for the full sample.  
<Insert Table 3-4> 
First, it is worth emphasizing that the empirical results of the LI and LMI samples provide only 
partial support to those of the full sample. We find that bank lending in LI countries positively 
depends on the global liquidity condition (measured by the U.S. money supply), while this 
relationship in LMI countries is negative. Furthermore, almost explanatory variables capturing the 
characteristics of domestic banking system (such as costs, capital, return, and concentration level) 
enter in all estimated models with insignificant coefficients or have the variant effects on credit 
supply. This is because the domestic banking systems in LI and LMI countries have not been 
enough developed and efficient. This less-development does not allow the domestic banking 
systems to determine themselves the volume of credit supply.  
<Insert Table 5> 
Second, compared to the LI and LMI samples, the results of UMI sample seem to be more 
consistent with those of the full sample. Meanwhile, there are still some different results. For 
instance, the coefficients of trade openness variables are positive and statistically significant. This 
means that the trade integration can alter credit growth in UMI countries. On the other hand, these 
countries have also experienced a falling trend in bank lending during the systemic banking crises.  
<Insert Table 6> 
Turning now to the HI sample, we first note that the empirical results strongly support those of the 
full sample. In addition, we find that the insignificant impact of economic growth in the full 
sample becomes statistically significant in HI countries. This means that the impact of economic 
growth on bank lending is country specific rather than general as earlier postulated. This result 
also allows us to consider the presence of potential threshold effect on the link between economic 
growth and credit supply.  
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In general, stressing the role of potential determinants in explaining credit supply in different data 
sub-samples allows us to avoid the potential heterogeneous problem of data. The empirical results 
for each data sub-sample are consistent with and complementary to those of the full sample, 
except the case of LI and LMI countries, in which we fail to determine the link between bank 
characteristics and bank lending. This exceptional finding can be explained by the fact that most of 
LI and LMI countries have experienced a less-developed domestic banking system.  
<Insert Table 7> 
Another problem with the original Arellano-Bond estimator is that lagged levels are often weak 
instruments for first differences, in particular for variables that are close to a random walk. So that, 
the second referred robustness check is the system-GMM estimator developed by Blundell and 
Bond (1998). As reported in Table 8, the system-GMM results are, by and large, similar to those of 
the GMM estimator in terms of sign and significance, but the magnitudes are different as would be 
expected.4 In addition, the system-GMM results confirm the significant role of trade openness in 
fostering bank credit supply.  
 
6. Concluding remarks 
The present paper empirically revisits the determinants of domestic credit across a wide range of 
146 countries at different levels of economic development over the period 1990-2013. Our empirical 
findings are generally insensitive to a range of datasets and estimation methods. We obtain several 
notable empirical findings. First, we reveal that bank credit is enhanced by a high level of lending 
interest rate, and domestic liquidity. Second, the empirical results indicate that credit supply is 
negatively related to capital requirement, exchange rate, KAOPEN index, bank concentration and 
non-performing loans. Third, we also find evidence of the country specific effect of economic 
growth on bank lending. Fourth, this paper offers a nuanced picture about the determinant role of 
several variables (such as inflation, global liquidity, ROE/ROA index and so on) on explaining 
bank credit growth. 
Several policy implications can be drawn from our empirical findings. Above all, the country 
specific impact of economic growth as well as the insignificant impact of inflation do not allow 
considering them as conducive factors to credit growth. For this reason, policies, which foster 
economic growth and narrow inflation, might not be sufficient to boost credit growth. Second, The 
negative impact of KAOPEN index indicates that a banking sector, which is heavily dependent on 
foreign capital to finance domestic credit, could make a country more vulnerable to external 
shocks and could also be prone to boom-bust credit cycles. This is why macro-prudential policies 
should be particularly vigilant to the funding role of foreign capital inflows. Third, the health of 
                                                          
4 Here, we only report the system-GMM estimator’s results for the full sample to save space.  
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banking system, which is captured by non-performing loans, rather than the profitability of 
banking system, also plays a relevant role in strengthening credit growth.    
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Appendix A: Country sample  
Country sample  Countries 
 
 
High income  
(44) 
 
OECD countries (30): Australia; Austria;  Belgium; Canada; Chile; 
Czech Republic; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; 
Ireland; Iceland; Israel; Italy; Japan; Korea, Rep.; Netherlands ; New 
Zealand; Norway; Poland; Portugal; Slovak Republic; Slovenia; Spain; 
Sweden; Switzerland; United Kingdom; United States 
Non-OECD countries (14): Bahrain; Croatia; Cyprus; Equatorial 
Guinea; Hong Kong SAR, China; Kuwait; Oman; Qatar; Russian 
Federation; Saudi Arabia; Singapore; Trinidad and Tobago; United 
Arab Emirates; Uruguay 
 
 
Upper Middle income (36) 
 
Albania; Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Azerbaijan; Belarus; Bosnia and 
Herzegovina; Botswana; Brazil; Bulgaria; China; Colombia; Costa Rica; 
Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Gabon; Hungary; Iran, Islamic Rep; 
Jamaica; Jordan; Latvia; Lebanon; Libya; Macedonia, FYR; Malaysia; 
Mauritius; Mexico; Namibia; Panama; Peru; Romania; Serbia; South 
Africa; Thailand; Tunisia; Turkey; Venezuela.  
 
 
Lower Middle income (36)  
 
Armenia; Bhutan; Bolivia; Capo Verde; Cameroon; Congo, Rep.; Cote 
d'Ivoire; Djibouti; Egypt, Arab Rep.; Georgia; Ghana; Guatemala; 
Guyana; Honduras; India; Indonesia; Kyrgyz R. ; Lao PDR; Lesotho; 
Mauritania; Moldova; Mongolia; Morocco; Nicaragua; Nigeria; 
Pakistan; Papua New Guinea; Paraguay; Philippines; Senegal; Sri 
Lanka; Swaziland; Turkmenistan; Ukraine; Vietnam; Yemen, Rep.; 
Zambia 
 
Low income  
(30) 
 
Bangladesh; Benin; Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cambodia; Central African 
Republic; Chad; Congo, Dem. Rep.; Eritrea; Ethiopia; Gambia; Guinea; 
Guinea-Bissau; Haiti; Kenya; Liberia; Madagascar; Malawi; Mali ; 
Mozambique ; Myanmar ; Nepal ; Niger ; Rwanda ; Sierra Leone; 
Tajikistan; Tanzania; Togo; Uganda; Zimbabwe 
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Appendix B: Data description 
Variable Source Unit of 
measurement 
Bank Credit to private sector WDI; GFD % of GDP 
Internal demand factors   
Bank Deposit WDI; GFD % of GDP 
Domestic real interest rate WDI; IFS % 
Bank costs to total income Beck et al. (2000) % 
Capital requirement WDI; GFD % 
GDP per capita (at 2000 price) WDI U.S. dollars 
Inflation rate WDI % 
Domestic money supply WDI % of GDP 
External supply factors   
Nominal exchange rate WDI LCU per US$ 
Capital flows (Stock FDI) WDI % of GDP 
Financial integration Chinn and Ito (2006) KAOPEN index 
Openness (Exports + Imports / GDP) WDI % GDP 
Global factors   
US money supply WDI % of GDP 
U.S. FED rate WDI, IFS % 
Domestic & US (global) lending rates’ gap WDI, IFS % 
Systemic banking crisis dummy Laeven and Valencia 
(2008; 2012) 
0 / 1 
External debt WDI % GNI 
Characteristics of domestic banking system   
ROE Beck et al. (2000) % 
ROA Beck et al. (2000) % 
Bank concentration Beck et al. (2000) % 
Bank non-performing loans to total gross loans GFD % 
Initial level of Banking development Beck et al. (2000) % GDP 
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Table 1: Summary statistics and correlation coefficients: Full simple 
Variable  Mean  Standard Deviation  Min  Max  Cor. 
coef 
  Overall Between Within    
Bank credit   3.277  1.050 0.959 0.438  -1.869  5.767  1.000 
Bank deposit  3.383  0.873 0.827 0.310  -1.682  5.713  0.860* 
Domestic real interest rate  4.645  0.253 0.107 0.229  -0.958  6.509  0.019 
Costs/Income  4.004  0.323 0.275 0.208  0.426  5.422  -0.078* 
Bank capital/Assets  2.167  0.425 0.384 0.185  0.405  3.421  -0.556* 
Bank regulatory 
capital/Risk-weighted 
assets 
 
2.705  0.303 0.288 0.170  0.916  3.884 
 
-0.440* 
GDP per capita  7.896  1.668 1.654 0.246  3.913  11.124  0.708* 
Inflation rate  3.776  0.500 0.277 0.417  -1.224  10.104  -0.290* 
Domestic money supply  3.673  0.706 0.648 0.290  0.481  5.817  0.837* 
Nominal exchange rate  3.228  2.996 2.689 1.305  -19.850  22.629  -0.272* 
FDI flows  4.461  0.136 0.040 0.130  -2.227  5.501  0.036* 
KAOPEN  0.338  1.581 1.382 0.768  -1.875  2.422  0.496* 
Trade openness level  4.265  0.590 0.579 0.219  -1.175  6.276  0.229* 
U.S money supply  4.271  0.121 0.000 0.121  4.086  4.504  0.192* 
U.S. FED rate  0.632  1.439 0.000 1.439  -2.303  2.092  -0.162* 
Lending rates’ gap  3.374  0.441 0.321 0.302  2.128  8.473  -0.452* 
External debt  3.791  0.934 0.783 0.564  0.213  7.231  -0.295* 
ROE  5.725  0.148 0.043 0.141  -0.600  6.125  -0.072* 
ROA  4.709  0.119 0.032 0.114  -0.674  4.876  -0.069* 
Bank concentration  4.215  0.309 0.270 0.156  3.063  4.605  -0.138* 
Bank non-performing 
loans /total gross loans 
 
1.529  1.045 0.834 0.645  -1.609  4.305 
 
-0.385* 
Note: * indicates statistical significance at least the 10% level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 
 
Table 2: GMM estimator’s results for Full sample 
Independent 
Variables 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Lagged bank credit  0.698*** (0.054)  0.734*** (0.042)  0.685*** (0.053)  0.598*** (0.060) 
Internal demand factors       
Bank deposit -0.020 (0.115)  -0.036 (0.083)  -0.078 (0.107)  -0.054 (0.074) 
Real interest rate 0.707*** (0.090)  0.838*** (0.075)  0.754*** (0.084)  0.377*** (0.100) 
Costs/Income -0.023 (0.032)  -   -0.003 (0.037)  -  
Bank capital/Assets 0.102** (0.040)  -   0.099** (0.034)  -  
Regulatory capital -0.112** (0.046)  -   -0.134*** (0.037)  -  
GDP per capita -0.019 (0.106)  -0.041 (0.118)  0.134 (0.122)  0.009 (0.087) 
Inflation rate -0.091 (0.053)  0.087 (0.057)  -0.119 (0.062)  -0.007 (0.050) 
Money supply 0.441*** (0.126)  0.450*** (0.100)  0.487*** (0.104)  0.562*** (0.090) 
External supply factors       
Exchange rate -0.170*** (0.057)  -0.159*** (0.041)  -0.117** (0.056)  -0.073** (0.032) 
FDI flows 0.050 (0.096)  0.028 (0.078)  0.110 (0.093)  0.048 (0.121) 
KAOPEN -0.026** (0.011)  -0.023** (0.011)  -0.010 (0.011)  0.001 (0.018) 
Trade openness level 0.040 (0.059)  0.002 (0.049)  0.002 (0.060)  0.022 (0.064) 
Global factors       
U.S money supply 0.131 (0.080)  0.112 (0.093)  0.009 (0.102)  0.023 (0.121) 
U.S. FED rate 0.005 (0.005)  0.007 (0.005)  0.001 (0.004)  0.006 (0.005) 
Lending rates’ gap -0.231*** (0.062)  -0.199** (0.048)  -0.281*** (0.055)  -0.244*** (0.072) 
External debt -0.021 (0.033)  -0.027 (0.031)  -0.024 (0.030)  -0.008 (0.026) 
Crisis -0.035 (0.034)  -0.018 (0.027)  -0.029 (0.029)  -0.009 (0.025) 
Characteristics of domestic banking system      
ROE -0.105 (0.127)  0.013 (0.011)  -   -  
ROA -0.095 (0.301)  -0.680 (0.419)  -   -  
Bank concentration -0.150*** (0.041)  -0.119*** (0.039)  -   -  
Non-performing loans  -0.037*** (0.011)  -0.048*** (0.011)  -   -  
Constant -1.955 (2.006)  -0.572 (2.172)  -4.490*** (0.911)  -1.480 (1.034) 
Serial Corr. (m1)  -4.672 [0.000]  -5.279 [0.000]  -3.782 [0.000]  -4.656 [0.000] 
Serial Corr. (m2)  -1.540 [0.123]  -2.607 [0.009]  -0.814 [0.416]  0.858 [0.391] 
Note: Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Values in brackets are P-values.  *** (**; *): Significant at 1%, 
5% and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 3: GMM estimator’s results for Low income sample 
Independent 
Variables 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Lagged bank credit  0.015 (0.060)  0.482***(0.067)  0.200** (0.089)  0.575** (0.066) 
Internal demand factors       
Bank deposit -0.069 (0.165)  0.022(0.195)  0.131 (0.267)  -0.034 (0.121) 
Real interest rate 0.576***(0.142)  0.427***(0.206)  0.692** (0.268)  0.303*** (0.074) 
Costs/Income 0.100 (0.097)  -   0.114 (0.097)  -  
Bank capital/Assets 0.384***(0.075)  -   0.272*** (0.069)  -  
Regulatory capital -0.304***(0.050)  -   -0.249*** (0.068)  -  
GDP per capita 0.601 (0.332)  -0.379 (0.350)  -0.260 (0.177)  -0.079 (0.223) 
Inflation rate -0.205 (0.120)  -0.025 (0.029)  -0.065 (0.092)  -0.093 (0.081) 
Money supply 0.819***(0.133)  0.530***(0.170)  0.689*** (0.208)  0.529*** (0.118) 
External supply factors       
Exchange rate -0.490**(0.215)  0.032(0.156)  0.023(0.278)  -0.046 (0.038) 
FDI flows 0.252 (0.158)  -0.326*** (0.095)  -0.145 (0.227)  -0.052 (0.214) 
KAOPEN -0.067**(0.027)  -0.001(0.025)  0.034(0.021)  -0.009 (0.030) 
Trade openness level 0.338**(0.153)  0.020(0.058)  -0.060 (0.129)  0.073 (0.111) 
Global factors       
U.S money supply 0.187***(0.087)  1.362**(0.536)  0.944**(0.353)  0.306*** (0.090) 
U.S. FED rate -0.115**(0.032)  -0.005 (0.012)  -0.061(0.045)  -0.015 (0.011) 
Lending rates’ gap -1.145*** (0.159)  -0.597***(0.184)  -0.828**(0.392)  -0.420*** (0.136) 
External debt 0.071(0.076)  0.031(0.078)  -0.045 (0.035)  0.021 (0.032) 
Crisis -   -   -   -0.064 (0.054) 
Characteristics of domestic banking system        
ROE -0.122 (0.118)  -0.189 (0.286)  -   -  
ROA -1.567 (1.407)  -1.096 (1.099)  -   -  
Bank concentration 0.143 (0.230)  -0.298** (0.131)  -   -  
Nonperforming loans  -0.164*** (0.030)  -0.031 (0.038)  -   -  
Constant -49.646*** (7.488)  3.864 (4.309)  -4.513 (4.973)  -0.906 (1.494) 
Serial Corr. (m1) -1.748 [0.080]  -1.624 [0.100]  -1.736 [0.082]  -2.777 [0.006] 
Serial Corr. (m2) 1.634 [0.102]  0.185 [0.853]  1.552 [0.121]  1.220 [0.222] 
Note: Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Values in brackets are P-values.  *** (**; *): Significant at 1%, 
5% and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 4: GMM estimator’s results for Lower middle income sample 
Independent 
Variables 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Lagged bank credit  0.752*** (0.053)  0.831*** (0.029)  0.791*** (0.048)  0.598*** (0.064) 
Internal demand factors       
Bank deposit -0.303 (0.176)  -0.293** (0.111)  -0.188 (0.131)  -0.147 (0.133) 
Real interest rate 0.506 (0.300)  0.782*** (0.126)  0.629*** (0.160)  0.314* (0.181) 
Costs/Income -0.020 (0.102)  -   0.074 (0.081)  -  
Bank capital/Assets 0.185 (0.133)  -   0.200** (0.073)  -  
Regulatory capital -0.176 (0.102)  -   -0.146** (0.057)  -  
GDP per capita 0.176 (0.114)  0.063 (0.126)  0.093 (0.134)  0.027 (0.149) 
Inflation rate -0.147 (0.109)  -0.141 (0.099)  -0.105 (0.087)  -0.006 (0.082) 
Money supply 0.842*** (0.117)  0.657*** (0.110)  0.716*** (0.095)  0.618*** (0.134) 
External supply factors       
Exchange rate -0.218** (0.096)  -0.275*** (0.085)  -0.295** (0.098)  -0.183*** (0.060) 
FDI flows 0.106 (0.329)  0.067 (0.324)  0.203 (0.347)  -0.029 (0.264) 
KAOPEN -0.024* (0.012)  -0.028* (0.016)  0.023 (0.022)  0.035 (0.026) 
Trade openness level -0.085 (0.060)  -0.063 (0.057)  -0.001 (0.082)  -0.022 (0.093) 
Global factors       
U.S money supply -0.357* (0.176)  -0.389** (0.164)  -0.415** (0.153)  0.188 (0.264) 
U.S. FED rate 0.005 (0.008)  -0.009 (0.008)  0.001 (0.007)  0.002 (0.008) 
Lending rates’ gap -0.133 (0.115)  -0.215*** (0.059)  -0.060 (0.087)  -0.378*** (0.093) 
External debt -0.059 (0.051)  0.014 (0.070)  -0.110** (0.049)  0.040 (0.048) 
Crisis -0.060 (0.058)  -0.079** (0.025)  -0.021 (0.039)  -0.001 (0.045) 
Characteristics of domestic banking system        
ROE -0.583 (0.582)  0.155*** (0.018)  -   -  
ROA -0.965 (1.461)  -0.432 (0.709)  -   -  
Bank concentration -0.093 (0.057)  -0.037 (0.059)  -   -  
Non-performing loans  -0.013 (0.015)  -0.054*** (0.016)  -   -  
Constant 5.563 (5.896)  -1.076 (4.081)  -3.359* (1.891)  -0.838 (1.228) 
Serial Corr. (m1)  -2.945 [0.003]  -3.215 [0.001]  -3.275 [0.001]  -2.958 [0.003] 
Serial Corr. (m2)  0.399 [0.689]  -1.382 [0.167]  0.305 [0.760]  0.949 [0.342] 
Note: Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Values in brackets are P-values.  *** (**; *): Significant at 1%, 
5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
 
 
24 
 
Table 5: GMM estimator’s results for Upper middle income sample 
Independent 
Variables 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Lagged bank credit  0.763*** (0.045)  0.764*** (0.050)  0.734*** (0.044)  0.720*** (0.054) 
Internal demand factors       
Bank deposit 0.042 (0.067)  -0.035 (0.055)  0.152 (0.098)  -0.247* (0.109) 
Real interest rate 0.501*** (0.117)  0.639*** (0.108  0.538*** (0.089)  0.396*** (0.128) 
Costs/Income 0.017 (0.068)  -   0.094 (0.061)  -  
Bank capital/Assets 0.103** (0.049)  -   0.127** (0.058)  -  
Regulatory capital -0.104** (0.044)  -   -0.087** (0.037)  -  
GDP per capita 0.075 (0.088)  -0.036 (0.115)  0.191 (0.143)  0.237** (0.109) 
Inflation rate -0.017 (0.056)  -0.074 (0.052)  -0.062 (0.066)  -0.036 (0.096) 
Money supply 0.195* (0.099)  0.260** (0.113)  0.151* (0.095)  0.520*** (0.145) 
External supply factors       
Exchange rate -0.151*** (0.047)  -0.148*** (0.040)  -0.074 (0.053)  -0.060 (0.042) 
FDI flows -0.027 (0.076)  -0.091 (0.076)  0.053 (0.087)  -0.086 (0.119) 
KAOPEN -0.019** (0.009)  -0.003** (0.001)  -0.007 (0.011)  0.007 (0.021) 
Trade openness level 0.082** (0.040)  0.073** (0.033)  0.033* (0.017)  0.057 (0.128) 
Global factors       
U.S money supply 0.046 (0.101)  0.174 (0.109)  -0.063 (0.103)  -0.184 (0.117) 
U.S. FED rate 0.001 (0.006)  0.002 (0.007)  0.000 (0.008)  0.006 (0.009) 
Lending rates’ gap -0.229*** (0.071)  -0.228*** (0.062)  -0.330*** (0.060)  -0.216** (0.100) 
External debt 0.048 (0.038)  0.081** (0.032)  -0.003 (0.031)  0.073 (0.052) 
Crisis -0.049** (0.019)  -0.091** (0.037)  -0.070** (0.034)  -0.074** (0.031) 
Characteristics of domestic banking system        
ROE 0.256 (0.225)  0.184 (0.229)  -   -  
ROA 0.503 (0.430)  0.154 (0.400)  -   -  
Bank concentration -0.090** (0.042)  -0.058* (0.030)  -   -  
Nonperforming loans  -0.060*** (0.008)  -0.068*** (0.011)  -   -  
Constant 3.548 (2.808)  2.094 (1.695)  -3.390** (1.269)  -1.705 (1.660) 
Serial Corr. (m1)  -3.350 [0.001]  -3.396 [0.001]  -2.935 [0.003]  -3.250 [0.001] 
Serial Corr. (m2)  -0.696 [0.486]  -0.969 [0.332]  -0.420 [0.674]  0.192 [0.847] 
Note: Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Values in brackets are P-values.  *** (**; *): Significant at 1%, 
5% and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 6: GMM estimator’s results for High-income sample 
Independent 
Variables 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Lagged bank credit  0.452*** (0.075)  0.435*** (0.067)  0.515*** (0.048)  0.714*** (0.048) 
Internal demand factors       
Bank deposit 0.012 (0.177)  -0.052 (0.132)  -0.182 (0.117)  -0.528***(0.170) 
Real interest rate 1.579*** (0.476)  1.202** (0.404)  1.299*** (0.285)  0.899* (0.489) 
Costs/Income -0.090 (0.072)  -   -0.059 (0.036)  -  
Bank capital/Assets 0.072** (0.033)  -   0.077** (0.035)  -  
Regulatory capital -0.160* (0.083)  -   -0.074** (0.034)  -  
GDP per capita 0.559***(0.162)  0.493** (0.234)  0.278* (0.147)  0.303*** (0.132) 
Inflation rate -0.126 (0.172)  -0.018 (0.214)  -0.053 (0.177)  -0.097 (0.225) 
Money supply 0.413** (0.175)  0.444** (0.159)  0.527*** (0.158)  0.437** (0.200) 
External supply factors       
Exchange rate -0.053** (0.023)  -0.090**  (0.033)  -0.063* (0.033)  -0.023** (0.011) 
FDI flows -0.256 (0.191)  -0.368** (0.151)  -0.242* (0.131)  1.020 (0.754) 
KAOPEN -0.119***(0.028)  -0.091*** (0.022)  -0.013 (0.014)  0.001 (0.031) 
Trade openness level 0.311***(0.088)  0.260*** (0.061)  0.206*** (0.055)  0.210* (0.116) 
Global factors       
U.S money supply 0.308 (0.170)  0.250 (0.158)  0.046 (0.169)  0.206 (0.248) 
U.S. FED rate 0.018** (0.009)  0.026** (0.010)  0.017* (0.010)  -0.005 (0.023) 
Lending rates’ gap -0.191** (0.094)  -0.167* (0.091)  -0.249** (0.111)  -0.135 (0.136) 
External debt -0.082*** (0.019)  -0.074*** (0.021)  -0.073*** (0.020)  0.008 (0.024) 
Crisis -0.024 (0.015)  -0.004 (0.015)  0.034 (0.028)  -0.015 (0.015) 
Characteristics of domestic banking system      
ROE 0.503 (0.430)  0.251 (0.189)  -   -  
ROA 0.569 (0.521)  0.333 (0.200)  -   -  
Bank concentration -0.151* (0.076)  -0.166** (0.078)  -   -  
Non-performing loans  -0.014** (0.006)  0.018** (0.007)  -   -  
Constant -16.336*** (4.026)  -9.923*** (3.082)  -5.630*** (1.976)  -10.132** (4.978) 
Serial Corr. (m1)  -1.904 [0.056]  -1.949 [0.051]  -1.981 [0.047]  -1.487 [0.136] 
Serial Corr. (m2)  -0.371 [0.710]  -0.722 [0.470]  -1.854 [0.063]  -0.636 [0.524] 
Note: Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Values in brackets are P-values.  *** (**; *): Significant at 1%, 
5% and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 7: System-GMM estimator’s results for Full sample 
Independent 
Variables 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Lagged bank credit  0.796*** (0.056)  0.857*** (0.043)  0.787*** (0.052)  0.697*** (0.051) 
Internal demand factors       
Bank deposit -0.143 (0.115)  -0.113 (0.101)  -0.118 (0.105)  -0.080 (0.071) 
Real interest rate 0.674*** (0.123)  0.808*** (0.094)  0.759*** (0.094)  0.297** (0.107) 
Costs/Income -0.036 (0.044)  -   -0.071 (0.042)  -  
Bank capital/Assets 0.114** (0.049)  -   0.120** (0.041)  -  
Regulatory capital -0.083* (0.049)  -   -0.129*** (0.042)  -  
GDP per capita -0.052 (0.061)  -0.034 (0.056)  0.026 (0.039)  -0.103 (0.055) 
Inflation rate -0.074 (0.064)  -0.093 (0.057)  -0.044 (0.061)  -0.096 (0.060) 
Money supply 0.424*** (0.112)  0.438*** (0.095)  0.457*** (0.091)  0.531*** (0.082) 
External supply factors       
Exchange rate -0.056** (0.026)  -0.052** (0.024)  -0.017** (0.018)  -0.054** (0.021) 
FDI flows 0.077 (0.126)  0.001 (0.104)  0.359** (0.147)  0.198 (0.139) 
KAOPEN -0.026* (0.014)  -0.034** (0.013)  -0.017 (0.013)  0.001 (0.013) 
Trade openness level 0.150** (0.064)  0.092* (0.047)  0.161** (0.066)  0.120** (0.060) 
Global factors       
U.S money supply 0.357*** (0.102)  0.376*** (0.104)  0.365*** (0.109)  0.198 (0.113) 
U.S. FED rate 0.011 (0.007)  0.015** (0.006)  0.006 (0.007)  0.009 (0.006) 
Lending rates’ gap -0.201** (0.069)  -0.158** (0.054)  -0.242*** (0.070)  -0.253*** (0.072) 
External debt -0.023 (0.033)  -0.032 (0.034)  -0.044 (0.026)  -0.038 (0.021) 
Crisis -0.061 (0.040)  -0.030 (0.024)  -0.049 (0.029)  -0.016 (0.030) 
Characteristics of domestic banking system      
ROE 0.221 (0.161)  0.128*** (0.013)  -   -  
ROA 0.008 (0.286)  0.721 (0.465)  -   -  
Bank concentration -0.170*** (0.043)  -0.145** (0.051)  -   -  
Non-performing loans  -0.055*** (0.016)  -0.061*** (0.015)  -   -  
Constant -2.531 (2.044)  -1.770 (2.679)  -6.190*** (0.959)  -1.708 (1.088) 
Serial Corr. (m1)  -4.545 [0.000]  -5.172 [0.000]  -3.668 [0.000]  -4.953 [0.000] 
Serial Corr. (m2)  -1.495 [0.134]  -2.095 [0.036]  -1.126 [0.260]  1.003 [0.315] 
Note: Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Values in brackets are P-values.  *** (**; *): Significant at 1%, 
5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
 
 
